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Abstract 
 
        Post crisis period in India is marked by ‘liquidity hangover’ which RBI’s Monetary Policy 
is visibly finding difficult to handle. While highlighting the ‘Ad-hoc’ monetary policy response of 
RBI in recent past, the paper tries to ascertain the significance of monetary policy variables in 
explaining growth. 
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Introduction 
 
The financial crisis which had its roots in the US sub-prime crisis was by no means a 
local or regional problem. Its trajectories were far beyond. The affects of the crisis were seen on 
almost all the significant economies of the world. Indian economy was not an exception. Thanks 
to the regulatory cautions and stimulus packages that were followed, we in India were able to 
salvage our GDP growth rate. Growth rate remained around respectable levels even when the 
world was seen gasping. 
  
What has become so difficult is not the global crisis per se, but the aftermath of the 
policy response to the crisis. The so called, ‘Monetary Hangover’.  RBI is seemingly gasping to 
contain this after effect.  There had been more than 13 episodes of policy rate changes in the past 
two and a half years alone. The inflation which at times had reached double digit is still far 
beyond from acceptable levels. Given this situation the recent policy change of RBI from being 
‘inflation targeted’ to that of ‘growth oriented’ is questionable.  
 
The objective of this paper is twofold, firstly it highlights the ‘Ad-hoc’ nature of 
monetary policy response of RBI in recent past, and secondly, the paper tries to ascertain the 
significance of monetary policy variables in explaining growth.  
 
Arrangement of the paper: 
- First we try and understand the exact nature of inflation in India, i.e. is the present 
inflationary situation the result of excess money supply in the economy or that of supply 
short fall? For this our variable of interest are WPI (our measure of inflation) and M3 
(our measure of money supply i.e. broad money). We are interested in knowing the 
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responsiveness of WPI growth rate to that of M3. If M3 growth rate explains WPI growth 
rate significantly then we have all the reasons to believe that inflation is indeed a 
monetary phenomenon and that RBI is doing it right when it’s tightening policy 
variables. 
- Next we will try to find out how exactly is repo rate responding to call market rates. As 
repo rates are changed under LAF and fluctuations in call rate are indicative of liquidity 
positions of the economy, it can fairly be concluded whether or not monetary policy 
response are in right directions. 
- If M3 growth rate is at all a variable of significance in explaining inflation. It would be a 
matter of interest to ascertain the influence of Money supply on GDP growth rate i.e. for 
the reference period.  
 
First thing first, let’s try and analyse the relationship between WPI (year on year) growth rate 
and that of money supply. We are using year on year growth rate of broad money i.e. M3.  
 
Correlations1: WPI, M32  
Pearson correlation of WPI and M3 = 0.830 
P-Value3 = 0.000 
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Scatterplot of WPI (monthly % growth rate) v/s M3 (monthly % growth rate)
 
 
 
Regression Analysis: WPI versus M3  
The regression equation is:  
WPI = - 1.72 + 0.677 M3 
 
                                                          
1
 The results of regression analysis were obtained by using Minitab ver. 15 
2
 Data for the relevant variables are for the year: January 2010 – February 2012 
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Predictor      Coef   SE Coef      T       P 
Constant -1.722 1.397   -1.23   0.228 
M3 0.67721   0.08766    7.73   0.000 
S = 0.646560            
R-Sq = 68.8%            R-Sq(adj) = 67.7% 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 1 24.947 24.947 59.68 0.000 
Residual Error 27 11.287 0.418   
Total 28 36.234    
 
The above regression analysis (with M3 coefficient being 0.677, P-value3 being zero, 
Adjusted R-Square of 67.7%) clearly brings out the significant relation between WPI and M3.  
 
We can fairly conclude from the above regression analysis that a percentage change in 
Money supply, bring about about0.677 % change in WPI. More over this relation is positive. 
That is, the post crisis inflation in India is indeed a monetary phenomenon. And any attempt to 
reduce money supply in the economy will ultimately help in curtailing the inflationary situation 
significantly. 
 
Having established a significant relation between growth rate of money supply and 
growth rate of WPI, our next interest of analysis is to find out, whether RBI is indeed responding 
to the excess monetary situation. For this we take the help of Call market rates.  
 
By asking other non banking financial institutions to withdraw in a phased manner from 
inter – bank call/notice money market, of late, RBI has sought to develop inter-bank call/notice 
money market into a ‘pure’ inter- bank call/notice money market. The advantage of this exercise 
is that now this ‘pure’ inter-bank call/notice money market has become a true indicator of money 
supply and money demand in the economy. If we find the call rates going up, this will indicate a 
shortage of money supply in the economy as compare to that of money demand. And a fall in the 
call rates will indicate the reverse i.e. an excess of money supply to that of money demand. 
 
 Since June 2000 RBI’s response to the fluctuations in the money market has been under 
LAF i.e. the Liquidity Adjustment Facility. Under LAF, RBI tries to alter Repo4 and Reverse 
Repo rates. Repo rates are the rates at which RBI seeks to inject liquidity into the economy and 
with Reverse Repo rate it tries to do the reverse i.e. to absorb the excess liquidity from the 
economy.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 The smaller the p-value, the smaller the probability that rejecting the null hypothesis is a mistake 
4
 Repo indicates injection of liquidity. 
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Correlations: Repo Rates, Call Rates  
Pearson correlation of Repo Rates and Call Rates = 0.959 
P-Value = 0.000 
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Scatter plot of Repo rate v/s Call market rate
 
 
What is significant is that both Call Market rates and Repo rates are positively correlated, 
with 0.959 this correlation is strong enough and that both are showing a continuous upward 
trend, especially since January, 2010. 
 
Keeping aside the policy responses for time being, the rise in call rates is in itself a 
matter of concern. A rising call rates signifies the legitimate productive demand for money of the 
economy and RBI as a responsible central bank of India is bounded by its very preamble to fulfil 
this productive needs. 
 
The question that arises is why RBI was shying away from fulfilling the legitimate 
productive needs of the economy. Is it wise to put curb on genuine productive needs of the 
economy for the sake of inflation control?  
 
Was RBI trying to control inflation by controlling money supply just for the sake of 
controlling? Just to be seen as doing something irrespective of analysing any genuine market 
needs? Has things changed significantly since April 2012, when RBI announced its policy 
reversal favouring Growth. Isn’t it that RBI trying to take refuge in an intangible variable like, 
‘inflationary expectation’ to correct its course? 
 
 Moreover one is forced to ask: Whether the present changed course of orienting 
monetary policy towards growth, against that of inflation, a right course at all? Let’s see what 
177 
 
data have to say. We seek to ascertain the relationship between inflation and GDP growth rate 
for the reference period i.e. from February 2009 to August 2012. 
 
Correlations: WPI Growth Rate (Qtrly), GDP Growth Rate (Qtrly)  
Pearson correlation of WPI Growth Rate (Qtrly) and GDP Growth Rate (Qtrly) = 0.537 
P-Value = 0.039 
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Scatterplot: WPI v/s GDP Growth rate
Qtrly figures in percentage
Reference Period: Feb. 2009 - Aug. 2012
 
 
Regression Analysis: GDP Growth Rate versus WPI Growth Rate  
Regression equation: ��۾ ������ ���� ሺۿ����ሻ  =  ૞. ૟૝   +    �. ૛૜� �۾� ������ ���� ሺۿ����ሻ 
 
Predictor      Coef   SE Coef      T       P 
Constant 5.6357    0.7860   7.17   0.000 
WPI Growth Rate 
(Qtrly)   
0.2302    0.1003   2.30 0.039 
S = 1.22898     
R-Sq = 28.9%    
R-Sq(adj) = 23.4% 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF SS MS F P 
Regression 1 7.962 7.962 5.27 0.039 
Residual Error 13 19.635 1.510   
Total 14 27.597    
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 With P-value of only 0.039 we can confidently claim that, for the reference period, 
there’s a significant relation between GDP growth rate and WPI. Even though having WPI 
coefficient as only 0.230 suggest that this relation is not strong enough. 
 
Concluding remarks: 
- Inflation in India in post crisis scenario is clearly a monetary hangover effect.  
- Again, raising call market rate points towards liquidity crunch in the economy. 
- What required to be done is not just inflation control through an overall tightening of 
monetary variables, but the present situation calls for remaining selective and targeted.  
- Adequate attention need to be given for correcting supply side bottlenecks. 
- Though there is a significant and positive relation between WPI and that of GDP growth 
rate. This relationship is not strong enough to justify RBI’s reversal in monetary policy 
targeting, i.e. favouring Growth to that of inflation control. 
- It seems RBI is responding not to the real economic variables but to that of Finance 
Ministry dictates. 
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